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EMINENT DOMAIN AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN 
GEORGIA: A GROWING STATE’S NEED FOR A 
NEW FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE 
Crystal Genteman* 
INTRODUCTION 
“The domestic tranquility is gone,” said Jacksonville, Florida 
resident Joseph Santoni, whose front yard was partially taken by the 
Jacksonville Transit Authority (JTA) for a four year construction 
easement.1 After the JTA started widening the two lane historic and 
scenic Fort Caroline Road2 into a four lane, Santoni often found his 
driveway blocked by construction equipment and his landscaping 
torn up.3 Like many state constitutions and the Federal Constitution,4 
Florida’s constitution guarantees that property owners receive just 
compensation when their property is taken.5 For the forty-eight 
month easement, the JTA offered Santoni a mere $1,400 in 
compensation.6 Dissatisfied with the JTA’s offer, Santoni, along with 
nineteen other Fort Caroline Road property owners, took their cases 
to trial.7  
Although Florida juries awarding just compensation typically are 
not allowed to consider the impact of a taking on the adjacent 
property, Santoni’s attorney argued that Florida case law often 
recognized an exception in road projects.8 Thus, Santoni’s attorneys, 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Christian 
Togrimson and Professor Colin Crawford for their assistance.  
 1. Tony Quesada, Jury to Decide Compensation in Road Project Partial Takings, JACKSONVILLE 
BUS. J., Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/ 
stories/2006/08/21/story04.html. 
 2. Kandace Lankford, Canal, Trees on Minds of Planners, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 20, 2002, 
available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/032002/neR_8904323.shtml. 
 3. Quesada, supra note 1. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 5. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
 6. Tony Quesada, JTA Must Pay More for Wonderwood Property, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Aug. 28, 
2006, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2006/08/28/daily1.html. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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who also represented the other homeowners, argued that the JTA had 
failed to recognize the damage that would be done to the 
homeowners’ property adjacent to the road in addition to the damages 
caused to the actual part taken.9 Mr. Santoni’s trial was combined 
with two of the other homeowners, and at the joint trial, the jury 
awarded Mr. Santoni $40,000.10 The total judgment for all three 
homeowners was $105,150 more than the JTA had originally 
offered.11 “We wanted to make them whole because they were 
sacrificing for the good of the community,” said one juror.12 Florida’s 
fee-shifting statute requires that property owners are made whole 
through the reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees,13 and following 
an extensive hearing, the circuit judge entered a final judgment on 
costs requiring the JTA to pay a substantial portion of the owners’ 
litigation expenses.14 Without a fee-shifting statute, would the Fort 
Caroline Road residents have been able to challenge the 
government’s offers? Is mandating that the government pay property 
owners’ attorneys’ fees in eminent domain cases therefore necessary 
to ensure that property owners receive just compensation and are 
made whole? 
Until 2006, Georgia also had a fee-shifting statute.15 However, the 
General Assembly repealed the statute as part of Georgia’s eminent 
domain reform,16 which was enacted in reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.17 Georgia, like 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Quesada, supra note 6. 
 13. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).   
 14. Jacksonville Transp. Auth. v. McEldowney, No. 02-02083-CA CV-C, Duval County, Fla. (2007) 
(on file with author). See infra notes 145–57 for a detailed explanation of the mechanics of Florida’s 
fee-shifting statutes. 
 15. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6. 
 16. HB 1313, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 17. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the city could authorize a private 
developer to take landowners’ properties for a large-scale redevelopment project because it constituted a 
“public use” under the Fifth Amendment). In a dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor warned that 
following the holding, “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, 
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.” Id. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
  Public outcry was swift and fierce to the Court’s interpretation of “public use.” Michael Allen 
Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: Public Use in the Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY 
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almost every other state,18 passed substantial eminent domain reform 
with the intent of preventing eminent domain from being used in 
redevelopment projects as it was in Kelo, while also providing 
citizens with more procedural protections.19 One such procedural 
protection was the repeal of Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute20 
because the statute had a chilling effect on eminent domain 
litigation.21 A property owner who appealed an award of just 
compensation could not be reimbursed for his own litigation expenses 
even if he received a larger amount on appeal than the government’s 
initial offer; however, if the property owner did not recover a certain 
amount on appeal, he would be forced to pay the government’s 
expenses.22 Through repealing the statute, the General Assembly 
removed an important barrier to litigation for property owners who 
feared having to pay the government’s expenses. However, this left a 
gap in Georgia law because the General Assembly failed to enact a 
new fee-shifting statute, such as Florida’s statute, that would 
reimburse property owners who are successful in their appeals for 
their attorneys’ fees in eminent domain litigation—thus ensuring they 
are made whole. 
Georgia’s constitution guarantees that private property will not be 
taken without “just and adequate compensation.”23 Although owners 
and condemning authorities often disagree about a dollar figure that 
is “just and adequate,” many property owners lack the sufficient 
resources to challenge the government in an eminent domain 
proceeding if they feel the government’s offer is too low. For those 
                                                                                                                 
DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (documenting the chronology 
of extensive negative media coverage following the decision and arguing that the newsworthiness of the 
decision at the time it was announced, the sharp dissents in Kelo, and the explosion of politically 
conservative media were substantial factors influencing public response to the opinion). 
 18. CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN LEGISLATION SINCE 
KELO 1 (2007) (noting that two years after the Kelo decision, forty-two states had passed some form of 
eminent domain reform). 
 19. Jody Arogeti et al., General Provisions and Condemnation Procedure: Provide a Comprehensive 
Revision of Provisions Regarding the Power of Eminent Domain, Crimes and Offenses, 23 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 157 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 179. 
 21. See infra notes 115–26. 
 22. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6. 
 23. GA. CONST. art. I § 3, ¶ 1. 
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who can either afford to hire an attorney or find an attorney who will 
work on a contingent fee basis, any potential recovery is offset by 
litigation expenses, including attorneys’ fees.24  
Due to Georgia’s extensive growth in recent years, Georgia 
landowners are in special need of a statute authorizing the recovery 
of attorneys’ fees for property owners in eminent domain 
proceedings. Between 1990 and 2000, Georgia saw a 26.4% 
population increase.25 Experts expect this rapid growth to continue 
and predict that the state’s population will swell by 34% between the 
years 2000 and 2015.26 Population growth increases demand for state 
services, which in turn results in more instances of condemnation of 
private property for public use.27 With such dramatic changes in a 
relatively short period of time, Georgia has encountered some severe 
growing pains.28 Although Atlanta is the eighth-largest metropolitan 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See infra notes 194–223 for a detailed discussion of financial limitations on the property owner’s 
ability to litigate his position. 
 25. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLAN. & BUDGET, GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (2009), 
http://opb.georgia.gov/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/45/18/162784478Georgia_in_Perspective_2009.pdf. 
Between 2000 and 2007, Georgia’s population grew at 16.6%, “more than twice the national growth rate 
of 7.2%.” Id. at 9. During the same time period, Georgia’s population growth was the fastest of all 
Southern states, even outpacing Florida. Id.  
 26. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLAN. & BUDGET, GEORGIA 2015 POPULATION PREDICTIONS 1 (2005), 
http://www.opb.state.ga.us/media/3016/georgia_population_projections_reduced_web_5_25_05.pdf.  
 27. See Memorandum from the Georgia Department of Transportation Office of Right of Way 
Acquisition (Nov. 6, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter GDOT Memorandum]. The information 
referenced from this Memorandum is unpublished and was gained from the author’s public records 
request to the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT).  
  Between 2000 and 2007, the number of properties acquired by the GDOT, in the areas of both 
acquisitions by deed as well as condemnations, increased in Georgia. In 2000, GDOT acquired 1,715 
properties by deed, as compared to 2,307 in 2005. The number of acquisitions by deed was greatest in 
2006 at 3,226 properties, then declined somewhat in 2007 and 2008 with 2,948 and 2,748 acquisitions 
by deed respectively. In those same years, the number of properties acquired by eminent domain showed 
a similar pattern. In 2006, GDOT acquired 409 properties via eminent domain as compared to only 169 
acquisitions via eminent domain in 2000. The number of acquisitions via eminent domain then dropped 
to 372 in 2007. Id. 
  Consequently, eminent domain is a growing area of practice in Georgia, as evidenced by the 
State Bar of Georgia’s addition of an eminent domain section in 2001. State Bar Appoints Charles 
Ruffin as Chairman of Eminent Domain Section, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 12, 2002, available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/legal-services-law-practice-major-us-firms/5897403-1.html (“Ruffin 
says, eminent domain litigation is a growing practice in the state of Georgia due to the surge in 
population growth over the past twenty years.”). 
 28. Christopher Quinn, State No. 1 in Growing Counties; Population Boom Brings Gifts, Problems, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 16, 2006, at 1C (“[As] tax bases grow . . . so do headaches . . . as leaders 
scramble to keep up with demand for new roads, schools and services.”). 
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city29 and second-fastest growing city30 in the United States, it has 
the second-worst metropolitan traffic congestion in the nation.31 
Despite being the country’s fourth-fastest growing state, Georgia is 
fourth from the bottom in transportation funding.32  
As with many states, severe budget constraints due to the 
economic downturn have compounded funding problems in 
Georgia.33 However, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act 
of 2009 (commonly known as the federal stimulus package) provided 
a sudden boom of funding for state infrastructure projects.34 As of 
September 2009, Georgia allocated nearly $300 million to highway 
stimulus projects that were at work or were about to begin, with an 
additional $450 million in projects planned throughout the remainder 
of the year.35 With this rapid explosion in population growth and 
money made available to fund much-needed public infrastructure 
projects through stimulus funding, increased condemnation of private 
property was both necessary and inevitable.   
                                                                                                                 
 29. Mary Lou Pickel, Atlanta Still a Magnet, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 19, 2009, at 1A. 
 30. Id. Between the years 2000 and 2008, the only city outpacing Atlanta in growth was Dallas, 
Texas. During that time period Atlanta added over one million people. Id. 
 31. Doug Stoner, Solutions Now, Not Later, GA. TREND, Dec. 2007, available at 
http://www.georgiatrend.com/guest-commentary/12_07_guest.shtml. As of 2007, the only United States 
city with worse traffic congestion than Atlanta was Los Angeles. Id.  
 32. Jerry Grillo, Traffic Gridlock: Can Atlanta’s Traffic Be Fixed?, GA. TREND, Apr. 2009, available 
at http://www.georgiatrend.com/features-economic-development/10_07_transportation_01.shtml. Two 
of Georgia’s metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) rank in the country’s twenty-five fastest-growing 
MSAs, with six counties experiencing growth rates over 40%. GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 25, 
at 8. Although such a plan has not been implemented, a 2006 article reported that “[t]he latest proposal 
on the transportation front is a 23-lane I-75 north of town” to deal with the growth. Quinn, supra note 
28.  
 33. Alan Essig, Cutting State Spending May Only Worsen Georgia’s Budget Crisis, ATHENS 
BANNER-HERALD, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/010809/ 
opi_374971938.shtml (“Georgia is facing the most severe fiscal crisis since the Great Depression.”); 
James Salzer, Revenue Dip May Mean More Cuts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 9, 2009, at 1A (reporting 
that the state is “struggling with the worst fiscal crisis since the Great Depression”). In fact, the budget 
crisis is so dire in Georgia that teachers and university employees were furloughed. Laura Diamond, 
Unpaid Days Off Set at Colleges, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 7, 2009, at 1A. 
 34. Tom Crawford, Money from Washington, GA. TREND, Apr. 2009, available at 
http://www.georgiatrend.com/politics/04_09_politics.shtml (reporting that of the six billion dollars 
allocated to Georgia, one billion will go to the Department of Transportation for road and bridge 
projects). The Georgia Department of Transportation tracks these projects on its homepage at 
http://www.dot.state.ga.us/informationcenter/gastimulus/Pages/default.aspx. 
 35. Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Transp., $51 Million in GA Transportation Projects Awarded (Sept. 
1, 2009), available at http://www.dot.state.ga.us/informationcenter/gastimulus/Documents/Releases/d7-
9-1-09.pdf. 
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As Georgia continues to expand, legislators must work to ensure 
that property owners receive their constitutionally guaranteed just and 
adequate compensation. Part I of this Note reviews the requirement 
of just compensation both federally and in Georgia, the condemnation 
procedure in Georgia, and Georgia’s limited statutory authorization 
for a landowner recovering attorneys’ fees in condemnation cases.36 
Part II discusses the federal government’s approach and other states’ 
approaches to fee-shifting statutes in eminent domain proceedings. 37 
Finally, Part III analyzes Georgia’s need for a new fee-shifting statute 
in eminent domain cases that would mandate that property owners be 
compensated for their attorneys’ fees in valuation challenges and 
proposes a model statute to be introduced in the General Assembly.38 
Such a statute is crucial to ensuring that property owners are made 
whole and receive just and adequate compensation in condemnations.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Requirement of Just Compensation and Attorneys’ Fees 
1.  The Federal Constitution 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
that private property not be taken for “public use, without just 
compensation.”39 Although the Supreme Court has held that “an 
owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have 
occupied if his property had not been taken,”40 the standard for 
compensation is generally fair market value.41 The Court has defined 
fair market value as “‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See infra Part I.  
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 40. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); see also United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 
14, 16 (1970) (holding that “fair and just compensation” should restore the property owner to “the same 
position monetarily” that he would have been in had the taking not occurred). 
 41. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945) (holding that “the compensation to 
be paid is the value of the interest taken,” and “[i]n the ordinary case, for want of a better standard, 
market value, so called, is the criterion of that value”). 
6
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willing seller’ at the time of the taking.”42 Although many property 
rights advocates as well as scholars have proposed alternate methods 
for determining just compensation, fair market value continues to be 
the standard.43 
In Armstrong v. United States, Justice Black asserted, “The Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”44 However, under federal law a property owner’s attorneys’ 
fees have not been interpreted to be a burden that the public should 
have to pay, and the property owner must bear these alone since they 
are not recoverable as part of just compensation under the United 
States Constitution.45  
2.  Georgia Constitution 
a.  Just and Adequate Compensation 
Georgia’s constitution, similar to the federal Constitution, 
mandates that “private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first 
                                                                                                                 
 42. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374). 
 43. See generally Rachel D. Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership 
Society, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 133 (Robin Paul 
Malloy ed., 2008); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 871, 874 (2007) (noting that some scholars have proposed that property owners receive no 
compensation at all for small takings, while others “doubt[] the wisdom of the eminent domain power 
altogether”). In Kelo, the most recent Supreme Court eminent domain case, the Court declined to 
address the issue of fair compensation, noting that “[w]hile important, [fair compensation is] not before 
us in this litigation.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 n.21 (2005). 
 44. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See generally Gideon Kanner, “Unequal 
Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking 
Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2007) (arguing that despite the Court’s “flowery language” 
and “benign-sounding judicial rhetoric,” its rulings are “harsh” and “exclude factors that sellers and 
buyers in voluntary transactions would consider”). 
 45. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (in assessing whether petitioner was 
entitled to the recovery of appraisal fees, the Court commented that “[p]erhaps it would be fair or 
efficient to compensate a landowner for all the costs he incurs as a result of a condemnation action,” but 
nevertheless rejected petitioner’s request, holding that “such compensation is a matter of legislative 
grace rather than constitutional command”); Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930) (“Attorneys’ 
fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain.”). 
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paid.”46 Furthermore, the constitution provides that “[t]he General 
Assembly may provide by law for the payment by the condemnor of 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by the 
condemnee in determining just and adequate compensation.”47 Thus, 
although the constitution allows for the payment of attorneys’ fees, it 
does not require it. 
A property’s value is calculated according to the fair market value 
at the time of the taking.48 Much like the Supreme Court’s definition 
of fair market value, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that fair 
market value is “the price a seller who desires, but is not required, to 
sell and a buyer who desires, but is not required, to buy, would agree 
is a fair price, after due consideration of all the elements reasonably 
affecting value.”49  
b.  Attorneys’ Fees as Part of Just and Adequate Compensation 
Georgia property owners cannot recover their attorneys’ fees in 
eminent domain litigation as a component of just compensation.50 
However, this has not always been the case. Although the Georgia 
Supreme Court has not changed its position on this issue in nearly 
forty years, in the 1960s the court waivered in its jurisprudence as to 
whether the Georgia constitution requires that property owners be 
reimbursed for their attorneys’ fees as part of just compensation and 
whether the court has the authority to make that decision.51 
According to the Georgia Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
this issue in 1971 in Bowers v. Fulton County, litigation expenses 
such as attorneys’ fees and expert testimony fees are not included in 
just and adequate compensation.52 Instead, these costs are 
“recoverable only where authorized by some provision or contract.”53 
                                                                                                                 
 46. GA. CONST. art. I, § III, ¶ I. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Wright v. MARTA, 283 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1981). 
 49. Clary v. City of Stockbridge, 686 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis omitted). 
 50. Bowers v. Fulton County, 183 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ga. 1971). 
 51. See discussion infra notes 52–75. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 348 (“No provision is made in the Constitution or by statute that authorizes the award of 
attorney fees and expenses of litigation as a part of just compensation.”). In reaching its decision, the 
 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 14
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/14
2011] EMINENT DOMAIN AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES  
 
837 
In Bowers, the court reasoned that a right to recover attorneys’ fees in 
condemnation litigation did not exist at common law and therefore 
held to the general rule that attorneys’ fees are not recoverable absent 
statutory provision.54 Justice Hawes, joined by two other justices, 
dissented and pointed out that the majority cited to persuasive 
authority rather than to any Georgia cases.55 Additionally, Justice 
Hawes argued that the majority had explicitly disregarded the court’s 
prior 1966 ruling in Bowers v. Fulton County requiring that the 
condemnee be “compensated for all damage to his property and 
expenses caused by the condemnation proceeding.”56 
In addition to lacking a precedential foundation, Justice Hawes 
argued that the majority’s holding was neither logical nor reasonable 
and that it failed to recognize the unique circumstances of an eminent 
domain proceeding.57 Contrary to a typical lawsuit, the defendant in a 
condemnation action has “done no wrong” yet is “being forced to 
give up his property against his will.”58 The government has the 
advantage of knowing that if a landowner attempts to challenge the 
condemnation by going to court, then she will likely recover less than 
fair market value once litigation fees are paid.59 Justice Hawes 
therefore reasoned that allowing a landowner to recover attorneys’ 
fees in condemnation actions would actually reduce rather than foster 
litigation since agents, knowing that they might be subject to paying 
                                                                                                                 
court analogized to the judicial interpretations of “fair compensation” provisions in the Wisconsin and 
California constitutions which do not provide for attorneys’ fees or other litigation expenses. Id. 
Interestingly, both Wisconsin and California now have statutory provisions allowing for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in limited circumstances. In California, attorneys’ fees and appraisal fees are recoverable 
where “the condemnee’s final demand for compensation is deemed reasonable, and the condemnor’s 
final offer is deemed unreasonable, in light of the evidence admitted in trial and the compensation 
awarded.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (2007). In condemnation for sewers and transportation 
facilities in Wisconsin, attorneys’ fees are recoverable where the jury verdict as approved by the court 
“exceeds the jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer by at least 
$700 and at least 15%.” WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2006). 
 54. Bowers, 183 S.E.2d at 348. 
 55. Id. at 350 (Hawes, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. (citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1966)) 
 57. Id. at 351 (“I think that reason and logic require the conclusion that compensation to a landowner 
for the taking of his property can never be ‘just and adequate’ unless he receives that sum which leaves 
him whole and undiminished after the completion of the process of taking.”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
9
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the property owner’s litigation fees, would be forced to make more 
reasonable offers.60 Justice Hawes also argued that the courts, not the 
legislature, were the proper authority for construing the meaning of 
just compensation within the constitution.61  
Five years later, the court changed direction when deciding to 
exercise its power to interpret the constitutional provision for just and 
adequate compensation. In White v. Georgia Power Co., the court 
held that private property owners in Georgia could recover attorneys’ 
fees and “all reasonable and necessary expenses of litigation” as part 
of “just and adequate compensation.”62 The court offered little 
reasoning for its decision to overturn Bowers other than noting that 
since the time of the 1971 ruling in Bowers, five new justices had 
joined the court and a majority of these justices felt it necessary to 
“reassess the constitutional issue.”63 Chief Justice Nichols’s 
concurring opinion echoed the dissent in Bowers, arguing that the 
1971 Bowers court had misapplied the court’s holding in Bowers v. 
Fulton County of 1966.64  
In White, the court laid out a procedure for courts to use in 
condemnation cases until the General Assembly could adopt formal 
legislation.65 The court’s recommended procedure contained three 
basic steps.66 First, the fact finder would determine the fair market 
value of the condemned property as well as consequential damages to 
any of the condemnee’s remaining property.67 Next, the fact finder 
would determine if the condemnee had suffered any additional 
damages “such as attorney fees and reasonable and necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Bowers, 183 S.E.2d at 351. According to Justice Hawes, recovery of attorney fees would not 
apply where the jury found that the condemnor’s initial offer represented fair market value. 
 61. Id. at 352. 
 62. White v. Ga. Power Co., 227 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Ga. 1976), rev’g, Bowers, 183 S.E.2d 347 (1971). 
 63. Id. at 342–43. 
 64. Id. at 385 (Nichols, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 
1966)). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Ingram agreed that the decision reflected the majority’s 
ruling in the 1966 Bowers case and opined, “In my view, this provision includes reasonable and 
necessary attorney fees, and expenses of litigation, which the condemnee must incur in order to obtain 
fair market value of his property taken, and, where appropriate, any consequential damages to the 
remainder of his property.” Id. at 392 (Ingram, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 343 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. The fact finder might be “three assessors, a special master, or a jury.” Id. 
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expenses of litigation” and make recommendations to the trial 
judge.68 Finally, upon the fact finder’s recommendation for damages, 
the judge would hold a hearing to receive evidence on the amount of 
damages and then award the appropriate amount to the property 
owner as part of “fair and just compensation.”69 
Following White, the Georgia Supreme Court further developed 
the law related to attorneys’ fees in two key cases. In Department of 
Transportation v. Doss, the court clarified its holding in White by 
holding that only reasonable attorneys’ fees could be awarded.70 
Furthermore, in Department of Transportation v. Flint River Cotton 
Mills, the court held that a property owner must receive a jury award 
greater than, and not just equal to, the government’s original offer in 
order to recover attorneys’ fees.71 
Only two years after White, however, the Georgia Supreme Court 
changed course yet again. The court took notice of the General 
Assembly’s failure to adopt the model procedure the court had laid 
out in White, and in Dekalb County v. Trustees, Decatur Lodge No. 
1602, the court overturned White, along with the body of law that it 
had developed since its holding.72 In holding that attorneys’ fees and 
other litigation expenses were not required as part of just and 
adequate compensation under the constitution, the court emphasized 
that the question was one for legislative determination.73  
Chief Justice Nichols sharply dissented to the majority’s reversal 
of White, arguing that the court indeed did have the authority to 
interpret the constitution of Georgia and that condemnors should not 
be able “to coerce a homeowner into accepting less than the full value 
of his property based upon a threat, expressed or implied, that if he 
                                                                                                                 
 68. White, 227 S.E.2d at 343. 
 69. Id. at 343–44. 
 70. Dep’t of Transp. v. Doss, 233 S.E.2d 144, 145 (Ga. 1977).  
 71. Dep’t of Transp. v. Flint River Cotton Mills, 235 S.E.2d 31, 32–33 (Ga. 1977) (reasoning that 
“[n]one of the expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, was necessary in this case,” and “[b]ecause 
there was no need for the condemnee to have a jury trial in order to be adequately compensated for the 
taking in this case, the expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, are not a necessary part of ‘just 
and adequate’ compensation here”). 
 72. DeKalb County v. Trs., Decatur Lodge No. 1602, 251 S.E.2d 243, 244 (Ga. 1978). 
 73. Id. (“[T]he development of the law in this area by the court illustrates the difficulties encountered 
when appellate courts attempt to legislate.”). 
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refuses the sum tendered, he will be subjected to the protracted and 
costly litigation against the condemning authority’s legions of 
lawyers and experts.”74 Despite Justice Nichols’s prediction that 
“[t]he people of Georgia surely will demand restoration of their rights 
by way of a constitutional amendment,”75 neither the court, the 
people, nor the legislature have yet to revise the constitution’s 
guarantee of full and adequate compensation. 
B.  Condemnations in Georgia Generally 
1.  Eminent Domain Reform Following Kelo 
In the wake of Kelo, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue introduced 
his “Private Property Protection Act” and announced that 
“[g]overnment must always respect the property rights of its 
citizens.”76 The proposal included several provisions aimed at 
protecting the property owner, such as “increased notice 
requirements,” “additional damages for property owners for 
relocation expenses and lost business revenues,” and “awarding 
attorneys’ fees to property owners who prevail on appeal.”77 The 
General Assembly held extensive hearings debating various aspects 
of Governor Perdue’s proposal as well as other proposals,78 and less 
than a year after Kelo, Governor Perdue signed Georgia’s eminent 
domain reform into law.79  
Generally, the Act provided several important procedural 
safeguards for property owners by adding new requirements for the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 245 (Nichols, C.J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. Justice Undercofler wrote a separate dissent in which he asserted, “It is not right; it is not 
fair . . . [w]hen you are forced to surrender [land] for the public good, you must be offered its fair price. 
If you are forced to sue to obtain its fair price then you must also recover the reasonable costs, including 
attorney fees, of waging battle.” Id. at 245 (Undercofler, J., dissenting). 
 76. Purdue Enters Eminent Domain Fray, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2006, available at 
http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2006/02/06/daily29.html. 
 77. Press Release, Ga. Republican Party, Gov. Perdue Announces Legislation to Protect Private 
Property Rights (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/ 
0,2086,78006749_83363896_83365243,00.html [hereinafter Perdue Press Release].  
 78. See Arogeti et al., supra note 19, at 166, for a detailed summary of legislative hearings 
concerning eminent domain reform. 
 79. Id.  
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condemnor while granting additional rights to the condemnee.80 First, 
the Act added “[p]olicies and practices guiding [the] exercise of 
eminent domain,” which were enacted with the stated intention to 
“encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by 
agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in 
the courts, [and] to assure consistent treatment for property 
owners.”81 The statute largely resembles the federal Uniform 
Relocation and Real Policy Acquisition Act of 197082 and includes 
requirements that “[t]he condemning authority shall make every 
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property by 
negotiation”83 and that “[i]n no event shall the condemnor act in bad 
faith in order to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the 
property.”84 The Act also added a statutory provision allowing 
condemnees to recover “actual reasonable expenses” in moving.85 
As a direct reaction to the Kelo holding, the Act virtually 
eliminates the use of eminent domain for redevelopment by providing 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 157–58. The Castle Coalition issued a report grading all fifty states and gave Georgia a 
“B+” for its eminent domain reform efforts. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 14. The report stated, 
“Georgia is another state in which 2006 will be remembered as a banner year for the protection of 
private property rights.” Id. However, the report’s narrow focus was whether states had made efforts to 
protect against Kelo-type public use and stated that the “basic question” of the study was “[h]ow hard is 
it now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to someone else for private 
gain?” Id. at 4. The report did not take into consideration states’ policies on recovery of attorneys’ fees. 
Some critics have argued that the Act will ultimately lead to a more extensive condemnation process 
resulting in increased costs for all parties. E.g., Fred D. Bentley, Jr., House Bill 1313 Overview, 
EMINENT DOMAIN PROGRAM MATERIALS 7 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia 2007) 
(stating that the bill will affect condemnations by causing “[e]xtensive delays for legal processes in 
condemnation proceedings and increased costs for all parties” and that “[m]ore condemnations will 
likely result”). The Georgia Municipal Association expressed concerns about Governor Sonny Perdue’s 
proposal for eminent domain reform, suggesting that certain provisions “would unduly burden state 
courts and overly complicate the redevelopment process by requiring a court hearing on the proposed 
use of eminent domain and by limiting its use to a property-by-property basis.” Editorial, OUR 
OPINIONS: Property Owners Count; Perdue’s Eminent Domain Plan Rightly Increases Protection for 
Residents, Retains Crucial Local Powers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 2006, at 14A. As part of H.B. 
1313, a court must determine “whether the exercise of the power of eminent domain is for a public use 
and whether the condemning authority has the legal authority to exercise the power of eminent domain” 
in condemnations filed after Feburary 9, 2006 before title can vest with the condemnor. GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 22-1-11 (2009). 
 81. Id. § 22-1-9 (2009). 
 82. CHRISTIAN F. TORGRIMSON, EMINENT DOMAIN: STATE OF GEORGIA 13 (AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4651–4655). 
 83. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-9(1) (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 84. Id. § 22-1-9(7). 
 85. Id. § 22-1-13(1). 
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that an agency’s condemnation power can only be exercised for 
“public use.”86 Public use is restricted to instances where the public 
will generally have the right to use the acquired property such as with 
roads or utilities.87 Exercise of the eminent domain power is 
expressly forbidden for “the public benefit of economic 
development.”88 Additionally, the Act repealed Georgia Code section 
36-42-8, allowing downtown development authorities to use the 
power of eminent domain.89  
2.  Georgia’s Condemnation Process  
Condemnors90 in Georgia begin the process of eminent domain 
through the Special Master method, 91 the Declaration of Taking 
method,92 or the Assessor method.93 Although the three methods 
follow different procedures, the basic process underlying each is 
similar.94 In each method, the condemnor must provide the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. § 22-1-2 (“[N]either this state nor any political subdivision thereof nor any other condemning 
authority shall use eminent domain unless it is for public use. Public use is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court and the condemnor bears the burden of proof.”).   
 87. Id. § 22-1-1(9)(A). Public use is defined to mean: 
(i) The possession, occupation, or use of the land by the general public or by state or local 
governmental entities; (ii) The use of land for the creation or functioning of public 
utilities; (iii) The opening of roads, the construction of defenses, or the providing of 
channels of trade or travel; (iv) The acquisition of property where title is clouded due to 
the inability to identify or locate all owners of the property; (v) The acquisition of 
property where unanimous consent is received from each person with a legal claim that 
has been identified and found; or (vi) The remedy of blight. 
Id. 
 88. Id. § 22-1-1(9)(B).  
 89. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 14.  
 90. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-1(3) defines “condemnor” to include public utilities, the State of 
Georgia, counties and municipalities, and other political subdivisions. School boards and the Georgia 
Department of Transportation also have the power of eminent domain. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-2-521, 
32-3-1 (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 91. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 3 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-2-101 to -114).  
 92. Id. at 5 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-3-140, 32-3-4 to -7, -12, -14, -16, -36(b)). The declaration 
of taking method allows municipalities, counties, and the Department of Transportation to acquire 
property for roads and highways and provides for a “quick take” procedure whereby the title of the 
property is immediately transferred to the condemning authority. See Andrea Cantrell Jones, Assessor 
Hearings, in EMINENT DOMAIN SECTION SEMINAR PROGRAM MATERIALS 097032, 1 (Institute of 
Continuing Legal Education in Georgia, 2009) (“The most common condemnation procedure I see is the 
acquisition of property by a declaration of taking.”). 
 93. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 6 (citing GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-1-6, -7, 22-2-26, -40–42, -62,  
-65, -80–81).  
 94. See DANIEL F. HINKEL, GEORGIA EMINENT DOMAIN 6 (2000 ed.); Jones, supra note 92, at 1. 
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condemnee with a notice of the condemenation95 that includes the 
facts showing the right to condemn, the persons whose interests will 
be affected, and the interests taken.96  
Under the Special Master method, a Special Master appointed by 
the judge has the authority to determine just compensation.97 
However, property owners may appoint their own assessors to make 
determinations in questions of value, and then the condemnors will 
appoint their own assessors as well.98 At the hearing, the property 
owners may present witnesses who may testify concerning the 
property’s value.99 The panel then determines the amount of fair 
compensation.100  
Though rarely utilized,101 the Assessor method operates similarly 
to the Special Master method. In the Assessor method, the 
condemnor chooses an assessor,102 the condemnee may then choose 
an assessor,103 and then these two assessors together choose a third 
assessor.104 The three assessors then set the value of compensation 
based on evidence presented at a hearing.105 
The Declaration of Taking method, by contrast, differs 
significantly from the other two methods. Since a Declaration of 
Taking involves sewers, gas lines, water or wastewater systems, or 
public roads,106 this procedure provides an expedited process in order 
to more quickly get the project underway. In addition to providing 
                                                                                                                 
 95. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-20. The condemnor must provide notice to “the owner of the property or 
of any remainder, reversion, mortgage, lease, security deed, or other interest therein.” Id. 
 96. Id. § 32-3-5. 
 97. Zuber Lumber Co. v. City of Atlanta, 227 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ga. 1976) (holding that “[t]he 
primary duty of the Special Master is to ascertain the total amount in money that will be equivalent to 
‘just and adequate compensation’ for the property and interests in property being taken by the 
condemnor”). 
 98. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-108.1(A) (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 99. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-65 (1995 & Supp. 2010). 
 100. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-108.1 (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 101. TORGRIMSON, supra note 82, at 6 (“Although applicable to most public entities for most public 
purposes, the Assessor method of condemnation has universally fallen out of favor with condemnors and 
is rarely employed.”). 
 102. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-26 (2009) (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. § 22-2-42. 
 105. Id. § 22-2-63. 
 106. Id. § 22-3-140. 
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notice, the condemnor must file a Declaration of Taking which 
includes an appraiser’s estimate of just and adequate 
compensation.107 The condemnee then has sixty days to surrender 
possession of the property to the condemnor.108 
In each method, the property owners have the right to challenge the 
amount of compensation. However, they must file an appeal in a 
timely manner or forfeit the right to appeal.109 Following a Special 
Master or Assessor determination, the property owner has thirteen 
days and ten days, respectively, to file a written notice of appeal 
requesting a de novo jury trial.110 The Declaration of Taking method 
allows for a thirty-day period to file a notice of appeal following the 
declaration of taking requesting a jury trial.111  
C.  Georgia Statutes Regarding Attorneys’ Fees 
1.  Current Eminent Domain Fee-Shifting Statutes 
Attorneys’ fees in eminent domain litigation can be recovered in 
Georgia where allowed by statute.112 Statutory allowance of 
attorneys’ fees is limited to three distinct situations, all of which were 
enacted through the eminent domain legislation of 2006.113 The Act 
codified the recovery of attorneys’ fees where (1) the government 
cannot acquire the property through condemnation,114 (2) the 
                                                                                                                 
 107. GA. CODE. ANN. § 32-3-6 (2009). 
 108. Id. § 32-3-12(b) (2009). In a condemnation procedure under any method, compensation must be 
paid before title is passed to the condemnor. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Garrett, 267 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court’s ruling of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where 
condemning authority failed to follow several procedural requirements including failure to pay 
compensation). 
 109. Dep’t of Transp. v. Palmer, 263 S.E.2d 514, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“The trial court does not 
have any discretionary right to extend the time for filing an appeal based on dissatisfaction with the 
compensation.”). 
 110. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-2-112(a), 22-2-80 (1982 & Supp. 2010). Since a Special Master’s award 
is mailed to the property owner, the code was revised in 2006 to allow for three additional days for the 
time of mailing. See id. 
 111. GA. CODE. ANN. § 32-3-14 (2009). 
 112. Bowers v. Fulton County, 183 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Ga. 1971). 
 113. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-12 (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 114. Id. 
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government abandons the condemnation proceeding,115 or (3) “any 
person, family, business, farm operation, or nonprofit organization” 
wins against a public entity in an inverse condemnation action.116  
2.  The Repeal of the Former Eminent Domain Fee-Shifting Statute 
Additionally, the Act adopted the governor’s proposal117 to repeal 
Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute, section 22-2-84.1. 118 The 
statute was originally enacted in 1998 in response to “a concern that 
private property owners were being ‘low balled’ by condemning 
parties, especially the Department of Transportation.”119 The 
legislature structured the statute with a punitive as well as 
compensatory element in an attempt to discourage frivolous litigation 
while also encouraging just compensation.120 Specifically, the statute 
required a party, either a condemnee or condemnor, who appealed a 
Special Master’s award to the superior court to pay the other party’s 
“reasonable expenses” if it failed to obtain a judgment changing the 
original appeal by at least 20%.121 Since the ability to recover 
attorneys’ fees hinged on which party filed the appeal, the property 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. Property owners can recover attorneys’ fees when “(1) The final judgment is that the 
condemning authority cannot acquire the real property by condemnation; or (2) The proceeding is 
abandoned by the condemning authority.” Id. 
  As of March 2011, no appellate decisions interpreting the statute’s application have been 
decided. The Georgia Court of Appeals did reference the statute in one case; however, the court found 
that the statute was inapplicable since it only applied to condemnations filed after February 9, 2006 and 
the condemnation act in question had been filed the year before. Gramm v. City of Stockbridge, 676 
S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 116. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-4-8 (1982 & Supp. 2010). The common law already supported this 
proposition. See, e.g., Columbia County v. Doolittle, 512 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 1999) (holding that the 
lower court correctly granted attorneys’ fees and costs in an inverse condemnation action where a jury 
found that a nuisance amounted to a taking). 
 117. Perdue Press Release, supra note 77. 
 118. 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6 (repealing GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-84.1).  
 119. Glen R. Fagan, Eminent Domain Condemnation Procedure Generally: Provide for Award of 
Reasonable Expenses in Condemnation Cases; Provide for Substantial Revision of Provisions Relating 
to Special Masters in Condemnation Cases; Provide for Special Master Panels; Provide for Powers, 
Duties, and Procedures; Change Provisions Relating to Notices and Advertisements Regarding 
Acquisition of Property for Transportation Purposes; Changes Provisions Relating to Interlocutory 
Hearings Regarding Adequate Compensation, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 115, 116–17 (1998) (providing a 
summary of H.B. 155 which made changes to eminent domain law including the addition of GA. CODE. 
ANN. § 22-2-84.1). 
 120. Id. at 119. 
 121. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (1982), repealed by 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 6. 
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owner could only recover where the government filed the appeal and 
then failed to obtain a judgment of at least 20% over the Special 
Master’s award.122 Thus, the property owner put herself at risk of 
having to pay the government’s expenses if she appealed and did not 
obtain a high enough judgment, but would be forced to bear her own 
litigation costs even if she obtained a judgment greater than the 
required increase.123 
In 2005, landowners challenged the statute as unconstitutional, 
claiming that it infringed on their constitutional right to recover just 
and adequate compensation.124 The landowners had been dissatisfied 
with the Special Master’s award of $6,500 and filed an appeal with 
the superior court.125 There, the jury only awarded them $6,900. 
Since this was less than the required 20% increase over the Special 
Master’s award, the trial court entered a judgment requiring the 
landowners to pay $3,500 of the government’s reasonable attorneys’ 
fees pursuant to Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1.126 The supreme 
court upheld the statute reasoning that since the ability to appeal a 
Special Master’s award is “a matter of legislative grace, and because 
a property owner does not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury 
on the question of just and adequate compensation,” the statute was 
constitutional.127 Additionally, the court pointed out that several other 
states had held that imposing the condemnor’s costs on property 
owners did not violate their right to just compensation.128  
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. If the condemnee appealed, he was required to obtain a judgment of at least 20% more, and if 
the condemnor appealed, he needed to obtain a reduced judgment of at least twenty percent, for the fee-
shifting statute to apply. In the case that both parties appealed, neither would be held liable for the other 
side’s costs no matter the final judgment. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Martin v. Henry County Water & Sewage Auth., 610 S.E.2d 509, 510 (Ga. 2005). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 511. 
 128. Id. at 511 nn.7, 9. The court cited to cases from Colorado, Minnesota, California, Oklahoma, and 
Montana. However, the court did not acknowledge that all of these states have enacted fee-shifting 
provisions since those cases were decided, and none of the five states include a punitive element 
requiring the landowner to pay the condemnor’s fees. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2009); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.031 (West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1250.410 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
27 § 11(3) (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-305 (2009). Delaware allows the trial court to require the 
landowner to pay the condemnor’s fees, however this is at the judge’s discretion. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 
10 § 6111(3) (1999). 
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Concerned that the statute had “a chilling effect on landowners’ 
willingness to appeal assessor’s valuation determinations,” Governor 
Perdue, in his proposed eminent domain legislation, urged Georgia 
Code section 22-2-84.1 be stricken.129 Although this part of the 
Governor’s proposal was adopted and the statute was repealed, his 
proposal of adding a new fee-shifting statute that would enable 
landowners to recover their attorneys’ fees on appeal was not adopted 
as part of the final bill.130 
 
3.  Applicability of General Fee-Shifting Statutes 
 
As in other civil cases, parties in eminent domain proceedings can 
recover litigation costs when the other party has brought frivolous 
claims and defenses131 or “acted in bad faith, [is] stubbornly litigious, 
or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.”132  
 
II.  APPROACHES TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN EMINENT DOMAIN 
PROCEEDINGS 
  
Only a small minority of states allow for the recovery of attorneys’ 
fees in condemnation cases as a component of just compensation 
under the state constitution.133 The general rule is that attorneys’ fees 
are not recoverable absent statutory authorization.134 Legislators, 
both federally and in many state governments, have provided this 
authorization by enacting fee-shifting statutes requiring that a 
                                                                                                                 
  In 2009 in Clary v. City of Stockbridge, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
erred in failing to award attorneys’ fees to the City where the landowners had appealed a Special 
Master’s award of $609,000 and then only received a $452,000 verdict at trial. Clary v. City of 
Stockbridge, 686 S.E.2d 288, 294–95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). Since the action began before the 2006 repeal 
of Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1, the statute applied. The court ruled that “under the plain language” 
of the statute the fees are mandatory, and therefore “the condemnees are responsible for the City’s 
reasonable expenses incurred during the appeal to the superior court.” Id. at 293.  
 129. Press Release, Ga. Republican Party, Gov. Perdue Announces Legislation to Protect Private 
Property Rights (Feb. 8, 2006). 
 130. HB 1313, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 131. GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-14 (2006). 
 132. GA. CODE. ANN. § 13-6-11 (2010). 
 133. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 672 (2008). 
 134. Id. 
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property owner’s litigation expenses be reimbursed in certain 
circumstances.  
 
A.  Federal Statutes Authorizing Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in 
Eminent Domain Proceedings 
 
In limited circumstances, a property owner may recover litigation 
costs in federal eminent domain proceedings when allowed by 
statute.135 The main provisions that entitle a property owner to all 
“reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable 
attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of 
the condemnation proceedings” are much like those in Georgia. 136 
Litigation costs are recoverable where a federal government agency 
initiates a condemnation action and then abandons the proceeding,137 
a federal court rules that the agency cannot acquire the property 
through condemnation,138 or a property owner successfully sues a 
federal agency in an inverse condemnation action.139 Additionally, 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act,140 an individual property 
owner with a net worth under two million dollars141 who is a 
“prevailing party” against a government agency142 is also entitled to 
recover costs including attorneys’ fees 143 where the agency’s 
position was not “substantially justified.”144 
                                                                                                                 
 135. David S. Black, Recovery of Litigation Fees and Expenses in Federal Condemnation 
Proceedings Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 APPRAISAL J. 92 (2004).  
 136. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2006), with GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22-1-12, 22-4-8 (2009); see also 
discussion supra Part I. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2006). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. § 4654(c).  
 140. Black, supra note 135 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006)).  
 141. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 2010). In addition to an individual property owner, “any owner 
of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or 
organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000” is also entitled to recovery. Id.  
 142. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(H). The statute defines “prevailing party” as one obtaining a final judgment at 
trial, “which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial 
on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested 
to at trial on behalf of the Government.” Id. 
 143. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).  
 144. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). In order to receive an award of fees and expenses, the party must submit a 
report within thirty days of the judgment showing that the criteria of the statute is met and alleging that 
the government’s position was not “substantially justified.” Id. 
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B.  State Approaches to Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in Eminent 
Domain Litigation 
Forty years ago, the vast majority of states had no legislation 
concerning attorneys’ fees in condemnation cases.145 Now, many 
states provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees for abandonment, 
inverse condemnation, or where the government fails to acquire the 
property.146 More importantly, a growing number of states have 
enacted statutes either requiring or allowing that landowners be 
reimbursed for their litigation costs if they prevail on valuation issues 
against the condemnor.147 The various state approaches providing for 
reimbursement of the property owner’s litigation expenses include: 
an interpretation by the judiciary requiring reimbursement as part of 
the state’s constitutionally-required just compensation; mandatory 
statutes requiring an award of expenses where certain conditions are 
met; allowing judges to decide where reimbursement is appropriate 
based on statutorily defined guidelines; and a statute providing fees 
up to a certain dollar limit. 
1.  Constitutionally Mandated Attorneys’ Fees 
Florida has long been known for providing the most generous 
recovery scheme of all states.148 Unlike Georgia, the Florida Supreme 
Court has ruled that recovery of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs 
are part of the state constitution’s requirement of just 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Barry L. Friedman, Attorneys’ Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694, 715 
(1969) (noting that at the time, “[o]nly four [American] jurisdictions allow[ed] a condemnee to receive 
compensation for his attorneys’ fees in completed condemnation actions,” and two-thirds of states did 
not require the government to pay the condemnor’s litigation expenses when the condemnor abandoned 
the condemnation).  
 146. See infra notes 149–91 and accompanying text. 
 147. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 890 n.108 (listing eighteen states that had statutes in 
2007 awarding full or partial reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in condemnation litigation either based 
on the court’s discretion or a requirement that the jury awards exceeds the government’s initial offer by 
a specified percentage). 
 148. See Friedman, supra note 145, at 704–05 (describing Florida’s provisions for attorneys’ fees as 
“generous” and “the most liberal found in any state”); Ted Jackovics, Eminent Domain Keeps Losing 
Ground, TAMPA TRIB., July 18, 1999, at 1 (“[M]ost observers agree [that Florida laws] are the most 
favorable in the nation for landowners.”). 
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compensation.149 In interpreting Florida’s constitutional guarantee of 
just compensation,150 the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that a 
private property owner “forced into court by one to whom he owes no 
obligation” does not receive just compensation when he must “pay 
out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing the fair market 
value of the property, which expenses in some cases could 
conceivably exceed such value.”151 The court recognized that the 
government’s power and resources often exceed those of the property 
owners in condemnation cases and that requiring the government to 
pay the property owners’ costs would level the playing field.152 
Early cases interpreting this constitutional mandate allowed 
condemnees to recover attorneys’ fees even where they did not 
prevail at trial.153 However, the Florida legislature amended the 
statutes relating to attorneys’ fees in 1994 to require that legal fees be 
computed according to the difference between the state’s original 
offer and the final award to the landowner.154 Under the statute, “the 
court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees 
based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.”155 The amount 
of the “benefits to the client” is based on the difference between the 
initial offer made by the condemning authority before the property 
owner hires an attorney and the final judgment or settlement.156 The 
court then uses a schedule set forth in the statute to calculate the 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d. 602, 605 (Fla. 1950); see also Jacksonville Expressway 
Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958) (“A person who is put to expense 
through no desire or fault of his own can only be made whole when his reasonable expenses are included 
in compensation.”).  
 150. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
 151. Dade County, 47 So. 2d. at 604–05. 
 152. Id. at 604. 
 153. E.g., Hodges v. Dep’t of Transp., 323 So. 2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that 
attorney’s fees should be awarded where the question of business damages were close, even though the 
property owner did not prevail on the issue); City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corp., 259 So. 2d 515, 516 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that condemnor was required to pay attorneys’ fees even though the 
jury awarded no compensation). 
 154. Jackovics, supra note 148. 
 155. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).  
 156. The statute defines benefits as “the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment 
of settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an 
attorney.” Id. § 73.092(1)(a). Additionally, the court may consider nonmonetary benefits that the 
attorney obtains for the client where such benefits can be quantified to a reasonable degree of certainty. 
Id. § 73.092(1)(b). 
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amount of attorneys’ fees.157 In deciding whether attorneys’ fees are 
reasonable, Florida courts look to what the property owner would 
likely pay if he were the one responsible for the fees rather than the 
government agency.158 In cases where the property owners 
successfully defeat an order of taking, the court must use several 
factors to assess a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees.159 Florida also 
allows property owners to recover attorneys’ fees during the 
acquisition process, and these are limited by the statute as well.160 
    2.  Conditional Recovery Based on Percentage of Increase  
Several states condition recovery of attorneys’ fees on the 
condemnee prevailing at trial. If the jury’s final award of 
compensation is greater than the condemnor’s initial offer and the 
statute’s requirements are met, then courts must award costs.161 Some 
states, including Montana,162 Oregon,163 and Michigan,164 only 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. § 73.092(1)(c). For example, for any benefit up to $250,000, attorneys’ fees that are up to 
33% of that amount may be awarded. Id.  
 158. Id. § 73.092(3); § 73.091(4). A Florida court found in one condemnation case that $225,000 in 
attorney’s fees was reasonable where an experienced condemnation attorney had spent between 2,000 
and 3,000 hours on the case, the jury’s verdict was a 300% increase over the condemnor’s original offer, 
other attorneys testified as to the reasonableness of the fee, and where the condemnor took no steps to 
try to settle prior to trial. Dep’t of Transp. v. Condo. Int’l, 317 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975). 
 159. Id. § 73.092(2). Some of the relevant factors that the court considers include “[t]he novelty, 
difficulty, and importance of the questions involved;” the attorney’s skill; the amount of money 
involved; the attorney’s time and labor compared the benefit achieved for the client; and the customary 
legal fees of a comparable service. Id. 
 160. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF RIGHT OF WAY, THE REAL ESTATE 
ACQUISITION PROCESS 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/rightofway/documents/AcquisitionHandbookEnglish.pdf. This booklet is 
given to property owners when DOT acquisition agents seek to buy their property. The booklet states, 
“The department will reimburse you for certain fees and costs you incur during the acquisition process, 
primarily for the services of an attorney and/ or appraiser. However, the law places certain limits on this 
reimbursement.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY, OPPAGA PROGRESS REPORT 2 (Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/0146rpt.pdf (“Florida is one of three states that 
pay landowner costs during negotiation.”). 
 161. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 890 n.108. In 2007, Alaska, California, Florida, Iowa, 
Michigan, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin all had statutes awarding full or 
partial reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in condemnation litigation based on the requirement the jury 
awards exceeds the government’s initial offer by a specified percentage. Id. 
 162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-305 (2009). 
 163. OR. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7) (2007). The statute mandates that the trial court award costs when: 
(1) the trial court’s award is greater than the condemnor’s initial written settlement offer, or (2) the court 
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require that the condemnee recover an award greater than the offer. 
However, the Michigan statute, much like Florida’s benefits-based 
rule, limits the award of attorneys’ fees to one-third of the difference 
between the agency’s offer and the final judgment.165 
Other states require that the final judgment be a certain percentage 
over the offer in order to recover. Alaska,166 Washington,167 and 
Iowa168 all require that the final judgment be more than 10% greater 
than the condemnor’s offer. South Dakota requires a greater increase 
and only awards costs when the final award is at least a 20% more.169 
Colorado has an even more stringent requirement, only mandating 
recovery of fees for judgments of a 30% or more increase over the 
condemnor’s last written offer.170 Of the states using this approach, 
Minnesota’s 40% increase is the highest requirement.171 However, 
Minnesota employs a hybrid approach by giving the court discretion 
to make an award of attorneys’ fees where the difference is at least 
20%, but less than 40%.172 
3.  Judicial Discretion  
In another group of states, landowners who prevail at trial may 
recover costs based on the court’s discretion. Similar to the 
mandatory provisions, condemnees must often meet certain 
                                                                                                                 
finds that the condemnor’s written offer “did not constitute a good faith offer of an amount reasonably 
believed by condemner to be just compensation.” Id. 
 164. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.66(3) (1998). 
 165. Id. 
 166. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 72(k)(3). Alaska awards attorneys’ fees where “the award of the court was at 
least ten percent (10%) larger than the amount deposited by the condemning authority or the allowance 
of the master from which an appeal was taken by the defendant.” Id. 
 167. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b) (2008). The statute mandates that the court award reasonable 
attorney and expert fees when the final judgment is at least 10% greater than the agency’s final 
settlement offer made thirty days before trial. Id. 
 168. IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2008). The acquiring agency must pay all costs where the commissioners’ 
award “exceeds one hundred ten percent of the final offer of the applicant prior to condemnation.” 
Additionally, in appeals, the agency must pay all costs of the appeal unless the final judgment is either 
the same or less than the commissioner’s award. Id.  
 169. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-23 (2004). Courts must award expenses where the final judgment 
is more than 20% greater than the condemnor’s final offer. Id. 
 170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2007). 
 171. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2005). 
 172. Id. 
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requirements before the judge decides whether costs should be 
awarded. Louisiana has the most general statute, only requiring that 
the highest amount offered from the condemnor is less than the actual 
compensation awarded.173 California awards attorneys’ fees where 
the condemnee’s final demand for compensation is deemed 
reasonable and the condemnor’s compensation is deemed 
unreasonable.174 Delaware requires that the final award is closer to 
the condemnee’s valuation evidence at trial than the condemnor’s 
offer, in order for the condemnee to request an award of litigation 
expenses.175 This law cuts both ways and allows the condemnor to 
request costs where the final award is lower than the condemnor’s 
offer.176 Regardless, costs are not allowed to exceed the amount of 
just compensation awarded.177 
Whereas Oklahoma and Idaho both require that the award of just 
compensation exceed a set amount of 10% of the condemning 
authority’s offer in order to invoke the discretion of the court,178 New 
York requires that the award be “substantially in excess of the 
amount of the condemnor’s proof” and be “deemed necessary by the 
court for the condemnee to achieve just and adequate 
compensation.”179 New York courts have held an award of 29% is 
“substantially in excess of the initial offer and thus qualif[ies] [the 
comdemnee] for reimbursement of fees and costs.”180 However, an 
award of almost 23% has been deemed insubstantial.181 Generally, 
awards over 35% have been deemed to meet the requirement.182 
                                                                                                                 
 173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:8, 19:109 (2004). 
 174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (2007). 
 175. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 6111 (1999). The court may award fees at its discretion, taking into 
account whether the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding, whether the condemnor’s 
position was substantially justified, or if there are “special circumstances [that] make an award of 
expenses unjust.” Id. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-711A (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11(3) (1997). 
 179. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (1987).  
 180. William D. Siegel & Saul R. Fenchel, Reimbursement of Fees, Costs in Eminent Domain Cases, 
237 N.Y. L. J. 20 (2007). 
 181. Id. 
 182. MICHAEL RIKON, EMINENT DOMAIN: STATE OF NEW YORK, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at 
16. 
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Kansas and Nebraska both make recovery of attorneys’ fees 
contingent upon which party appeals the initial award. In Kansas, the 
judge has discretion to render a judgment of attorneys’ fees whenever 
the condemnor files the appeal and then the jury renders a verdict for 
the landowner above the appraisers’ award.183 Nebraska has a more 
complex system, allowing the court discretion to award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees to the condemnee where: the condemnee appeals and 
is awarded a judgment 15% greater than the appraisers’ award; the 
condemnor appeals and the final judgment is not less than 85% of the 
appraisers’ award; or, both parties appeal and the final judgment is 
greater than the appraisers’ award.184 Where only the condemnee 
appeals and does not receive a judgment equal to or greater than the 
appraisers’ award, the court may award costs to the condemnor, not 
including expert or attorney fees.185 
4.  Fee Capping 
Pennsylvania takes a unique approach to the recovery of attorneys’ 
fees in eminent domain litigation. Under its statute, a property owner 
in an eminent domain action generally receives reimbursement of 
reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees; however, the amount 
is capped at $4,000.186 
5.  Georgia Compared to Other Southeastern States 
Many of the southeastern states, like Georgia, have experienced 
above-average growth in recent years.187 These states generally limit 
recovery of attorneys’ fees to the same instances as Georgia and 
federal law: when the property owner is successful in an inverse 
condemnation action, the government agency fails to acquire the 
property, or the government agency abandons the condemnation after 
                                                                                                                 
 183. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-509 (2000). 
 184. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-720 (2009). 
 185. Id. 
 186. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 710 (2009). 
 187. GEORGIA IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 25, at 9. Between 2000 and 2007, Florida, Tennessee, 
South Carolina, and North Carolina all had population growth rates which were above the national 
average. Alabama and Mississippi’s growth rates, however, were below the national average. Id. 
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the action has commenced. This is the case in Alabama,188 
Mississippi,189 North Carolina,190 and Virginia.191  
In addition to providing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees in the 
above mentioned scenarios, South Carolina also follows the judicial 
discretion approach and statutorily provides that “[a] landowner who 
prevails in the trial of a condemnation action, in addition to his 
compensation for the property, may recover his reasonable litigation 
expenses,” subject to the judge’s discretion.192 This provision does 
not apply to settlements and defines “prevails” to mean the 
compensation awarded “is at least as close to the highest valuation of 
the property that is attested to at trial on behalf of the landowner as it 
is to the highest valuation of the property that is attested to at trial on 
behalf of the condemnor.”193 
                                                                                                                 
 188. In White v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees 
were not part of “just compensation” in eminent domain actions. 319 So. 2d 247, 247 (Ala. 1975). 
Alabama Code section 18-1A-232 provides for litigation expenses where an action is dismissed by the 
plaintiff or the court determines that the condemning authority cannot acquire the property. This code 
section mandates the inclusion of a property owner’s litigation expenses as part of a plaintiff’s 
compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding. ALA. CODE § 18-1A-232 (2009). Additionally, 
Alabama Code section 18-1A-95 provides that attorneys’ fees in a direct condemnation act are 
recoverable where the condemning agency lacks the authority to condemn the property. ALA. CODE 
§ 18-1A-95 (2009). 
 189. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-37-9 (2009) provides for the recovery of litigation expenses including 
attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation actions. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-37 (2009) provides 
attorneys’ fees to property owners where “the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment condemning the 
property” or if the plaintiff dismisses the suit. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held in Maples v. 
Mississippi State Highway Commission that litigation expenses are not recoverable by a defendant in an 
eminent domain proceeding as part of just compensation. 617 So. 2d 265, 271 (Miss. 1993). 
 190. In Department of Transportation v. Winston Container Co., the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina held that the landowner’s litigation expenses and costs are not considered part of just 
compensation. 263 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). By statute, judges have the discretion to 
award attorneys’ fees if the condemnor abandons the action, if the court issues a final judgment denying 
the condemnation, or in an inverse condemnation action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-8 (2009).  
 191. A state agency must reimburse a property owner for reasonable costs, including reasonable 
attorneys’ fees where the owner obtains a final judgment that the agency cannot acquire the property or 
the agency abandons the action. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-419 (2003). Attorneys’ fees are also recoverable 
where a plaintiff receives just compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-187 (2001). 
 192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510(B)(1) (2007). The court has the discretion to reduce the amount of 
the award, or even deny the award, upon a finding that the landowner “engaged in conduct which unduly 
and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action,” the condemnor’s position was 
“substantially justified,” or that “special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id. 
 193. Id. § 28-2-510(B)(2). The requirements of the statute are illustrated in City of Folly Beach v. 
Atlantic House Properties, Ltd. There, the landowner stipulated at trial that the value of its property was 
$642,500, whereas the city stipulated that it was worth $31,000. The compensation awarded by the jury 
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An outlier, Tennessee does not allow recovery of attorneys’ fees in 
these situations and is especially harsh in requiring that if a party 
appeals the finding of a jury of inquest and the jury verdict at trial 
either affirms the ruling or makes a less favorable finding, then the 
appellant must pay court costs.194 
6.  Evaluation of State Approaches 
Although the Southern states may be slow in adopting fee-shifting 
provisions, the general trend in recent years has been a recognition by 
many states that fee-shifting statutes, whether mandatory or 
discretionary, are necessary in eminent domain litigation in order to 
make landowners whole. Florida’s approach195 of providing 
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees as part of constitutionally 
guaranteed just compensation offers the strongest protection for 
landowners since this right can only be overturned by the Florida 
Supreme Court or an amendment to the Florida Constitution. 
However, because many states, including Georgia, follow the general 
rule that attorneys’ fees are a matter of legislative grace rather than 
constitutional command, they would not adopt this aspect of Florida’s 
approach. Nevertheless, Florida’s benefits based statute could be 
incorporated by many states and would provide a bright-line rule for 
recovery while encouraging meritorious claims by only allowing the 
recovery of litigation expenses on the amount of the benefit that the 
attorney gains for the property owner.  
The conditional mandatory provisions, which provide 
reimbursement when a landowner gains a specified increase on 
appeal, also provide a bright-line rule. However, these statutes are 
                                                                                                                 
was $250,000. The court found that the landowner did not prevail because the difference ($392,500) 
between the value that he offered at trial ($642,500) and the compensation that was awarded to him 
($250,000) was greater than the difference ($219,000) between the value that the City offered at trial 
($31,000) and the awarded compensation ($250,000). City of Folly Beach v. Atl. House Props., Ltd., 
467 S.E.2d 928, 929 (S.C. 1996). 
 194. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-119 (2002). “If the verdict of the jury, upon the trial, affirms the 
finding of the jury of inquest, or is more unfavorable to the appellant than the finding of such jury, the 
costs shall be adjudged against such appellant; otherwise the court may award costs as in chancery 
cases.” Id.  
 195. See supra notes 148–60 and accompanying text. 
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based on arbitrary percentages and allow little flexibility. Alternately, 
the purely judicial discretion approach offers flexibility but fails to 
provide a bright-line rule, which is crucial to accomplishing a fee-
shifting statute’s dual purposes of providing a check on the 
government so that more fair offers are made from the outset and 
making property owners whole when they must litigate to receive fair 
compensation.196 Finally, though mandatory, a statute that caps fees 
at a low amount, such as Pennsylvania’s statute,197 would not be 
substantially different from no provision at all, since the award would 
be so limited that none of the statute’s goals would be accomplished. 
III.  A PROPOSAL FOR A FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE IN GEORGIA 
Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the General Assembly have 
acknowledged the need for a statute authorizing the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in eminent domain actions in Georgia.198 Of the 
various statutory approaches, Georgia should adopt a fee-shifting 
statute much like Florida’s benefits based statute,199 while also 
incorporating an element of judicial discretion. 
A.  Georgia’s Current Statute 
Since the repeal of Georgia’s former fee-shifting statute, Georgia 
Code section 22-2-84.1, Georgia landowners no longer face the fear 
that they may have to pay the government’s expenses on appeal. 
However, by repealing the entire statute and failing to enact an 
alternative, the legislature has put Georgia landowners largely in the 
same position that they were in prior to the enactment of the statute. 
Despite the significant reform in 2006 adding procedural protections 
for property owners, condemnees still need the procedural protection 
of a statute that will require a condemning authority to pay the 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See discussion infra Part III. 
 197. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 710 (2009). 
 198. See discussion supra Part II. 
 199. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).  
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landowner’s attorneys’ fees in the event that the landowner is forced 
to litigate in order to recover just compensation. 
B.  Justifications for a Fee-Shifting Statute 
Two primary justifications exist for enacting a fee-shifting statute 
reimbursing property owners for their litigation expenses in eminent 
domain litigation. First, because of the uniqueness of the eminent 
domain process, a statute requiring that the government must pay the 
landowner’s attorneys’ fees in the event that the landowner must go 
to court to receive just compensation encourages the government to 
make more fair offers from the outset. A fee-shifting statute provides 
a check on the government’s negotiations in the acquisition process. 
Second, reimbursing a property owner who must litigate and incur 
expenses in order to receive just compensation is fundamentally fair 
because it makes the property owner whole. 
1.  Preserving Checks and Balances 
Government appraisers have often been criticized for “low-ball” 
offers.200 News reports abound with stories of owners receiving an 
offer for significantly less than the value actually awarded when the 
case is litigated.201 Although critics have argued that such cases 
represent extreme and gross exaggerations of the norm,202 few studies 
                                                                                                                 
 200. E.g., Fagan supra note 119, at 116–17 (Georgia Code section 22-2-84.1 was originally enacted to 
combat perceived lowball offers by the Georgia DOT); Dustin Block, The Price of Progress: Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation and Eminent Domain, THE DAILY REP., Apr. 10, 2009 (“Lawyers argue 
that their ability to challenge WisDOT at all proves the agency lowballs property owners.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Block, supra note 200 (reporting case where the Wisconsin DOT offered a property 
owner $300,000 for a piece of land, the property owner appealed, and then the DOT settled with the 
owner for $1.6 million); Robin Fields, Eminent Domain: It’s the Brigham Family Way, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), June 22, 1998, at 12A (reporting case where the state offered a condemnee $25 
million for almost 600 acres of beachfront property, the state refused a counteroffer of $45 million, and 
then the condemnee won a settlement of $84 million); Charlie Frago, Eminent-Domain Proposal 
Falters: Measure Deals with Making State Pay Some Attorneys, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 
2009 (reporting case of an attorney who paid $400,000 for billboards that were condemned only three 
years later, was offered $50,000 for them by the DOT, and eventually received $150,000 after litigating 
his case). 
 202. E.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 105 (2006) (“Not only are Takers legally obligated to attempt to negotiate a voluntary 
purchase before resorting to a formal eminent domain proceeding, but they operate under legal and 
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have been conducted concerning whether a condemning agency’s 
offer routinely falls below the fair market value.  
A study of over 2,000 condemned parcels in New York in the 
1960s known as the “Nassau Study”203 is often cited by scholars 
discussing just compensation.204 Nassau County, which at the time of 
the study included parts of Long Island, Queens, and Kings, New 
York, was one of the fastest growing areas in the country at the time 
of the study.205 After analyzing 110 acquisitions occurring in a four-
year period,206 the study concluded that “gross underpayment can 
now be substantiated” in Nassau County.207 The study further 
expressed that “the practices and attitudes of Nassau County, as we 
have reported them, may indeed typify those of condemnors 
elsewhere.”208 
A more recent study examining 207 transactions of single-family 
homes during the construction of a California state highway between 
April and October of 1991 argues the opposite.209 This study 
                                                                                                                 
financial incentives that strongly encourage them to succeed. As a result, they may offer property 
owners more than market value for their property in order to avoid costly eminent domain 
proceedings.”). 
 203. Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look Into the 
Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1967). 
 204. See Gideon Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to “Fulfill 
Their Unique Role?” A Response to Professor Dyal-Chand, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 444 n.87 (2009) 
(citing to a plethora of law review articles that have discussed the Nassau Study including the following: 
W. Harold Bigham, “Fair Market Value,” “Just Compensation” and the Constitution: A Critical View, 
24 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1970); Nathan Burdsell, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 79, 82 (2005); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 579 (1995); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent 
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277 (1985); Frank A. Aloi & Arthur Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of 
Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 647 (1968); 
Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
765, 770–87 (1973); Frank S. Sengstock & John W. McAuliffe, What Is the Price of Eminent Domain? 
An Introduction to the Problems of Valuation in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 44 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 185, 191 (1966); Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the 
Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1991); Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost 
Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises are Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 483 (1985)). 
 205. Berger & Rohan, supra note 203, at 432. 
 206. Id. at 434. 
 207. Id. at 457. 
 208. Id. at 458. 
 209. Krisandra Guidry & A. Quang Do, Eminent Domain and Just Compensation for Single-Family 
Homes, 66 APPRAISAL J. 231 (1998). 
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concluded that the owners were not undercompensated but instead 
had received a premium of 4.7% for their properties.210 Only five 
pages long, the study offered no explanation for the types of takings 
involved. The study seemed to analyze only instances where the 
entire property was taken and then compared the negotiated prices to 
the fair market values which were determined by examining the 
homes’ various features such as number of bathrooms, view, square 
footage, age, and number of garages.211 If this is the case, the study 
fails to consider cases of easements or partial takings. In both of these 
scenarios, which are common when properties are taken for roads, the 
fair market value is more difficult to calculate because consequential 
damages must be taken into consideration.212 
Following the Court’s decision in Kelo, Congress mandated that 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct “a nationwide 
study on the use of eminent domain by state and local 
governments.”213 Like much of the eminent domain reports following 
Kelo, the report mainly focused on the purposes for which eminent 
domain can be used.214 However, the report also examined the 
acquisition process used by states.215 In doing so, the GAO met with 
multiple property owners and property rights groups.216 The GAO 
found that these groups believe that condemnors often make below-
market offers and that property owners cannot afford to litigate to 
obtain additional compensation because the court costs are too 
high.217 
Data gained from Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) 
records indicates that these property rights groups’ arguments may 
have merit and that Georgia property owners may not receive just 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at 233. 
 212. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text for an example of consequential damages in a road 
project condemnation. 
 213. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT 
ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 30. 
 217. Id. at 35–36. 
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compensation for DOT takings.218 The concern that the DOT was 
making lowball offers to Georgia property owners prompted the 
General Assembly in 1998 to enact a fee-shifting statute.219 Because 
this practice likely continues, this concern should again prompt the 
legislature to act. Many condemnations by the DOT are carried out 
through the Declaration of Taking method, meaning that the appraiser 
pays in the amount of just compensation to the court and then the 
condemnee has the opportunity to appeal.220 Of those condemnees 
that appeal their awards, many reach a legal settlement and never 
actually go to a jury trial.221 In the case of legal settlements, as well 
as with jury trials, the final amount usually far exceeds the pay-in 
amount.222 If the final settlement amount or jury award represents the 
actual fair market value, then the pay-in amounts often fall well 
below fair market value. This could indicate that the DOT is not 
offering adequate compensation, and the owner must fight the 
appraiser’s determination in order to receive just compensation. 
However, a comparison of the number of acquisitions by deed to 
condemnations via eminent domain shows that most people are able 
to negotiate a suitable price with the DOT and condemnation is 
usually not necessary.223 This data could be construed as showing 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See GDOT Memorandum, supra note 27. The author makes no claims that any conclusions 
drawn are the result of thorough statistical analysis. This Note reports raw numbers as supplied by the 
DOT and attempts to evaluate those numbers as evidence in trends in acquisitions in Georgia. 
 219. Fagan, supra note 119, at 116–17. 
 220. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-3-6(b) (2009). 
 221. GDOT Memorandum, supra note 27. Of the 169 condemnations in 2000, 60 resulted in legal 
settlements and only eight went to jury trials. Id. In 2005, 120 condemnations resulted in legal 
settlements with only 13 going to jury trials. Id.  
 222. Id. In 2000, the final award in eight jury trials ranged from 10% to 757% greater than the pay-in 
amount. Of thirteen jury trials in 2005, final judgments ranged from 32% to almost 10,000% increases 
over the pay-in amount. In 2006, awards ranged from 16% to almost a 5,000% increase. Id. Settlements 
also show disparities, sometimes very large, between the pay in amount and the final award. Of the 
forty-three listed settlements in 2000 that contained data for both pay-in amounts and final awards, 
twenty-two showed a 100% increase or greater in the pay-in amount. Id. An additional eight had 
increases between 50% and 99% increases. Id. In 2005, of the 108 settlements with available data, forty-
nine resulted in final settlements over 100% greater than the pay-in amount and twenty-four settlements 
were in the 50% to 99% increase range. Id. 
 223. Id.  
Breakdown of Georgia Acquisitions in Four Selected Years 
Year 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Acquisition by deed 1,715 2,307 3,226 2,948 
Acquisition by Eminent Domain 169 201 409 372 
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that the DOT offers a fair price from the outset, thus alleviating the 
necessity of eminent domain. However, another possible explanation 
is that property owners accept these offers because they lack either 
the resources or the knowledge to challenge the government’s 
offer.224 Confronted with the possibility of hundreds, and often 
thousands, of dollars in litigation expenses, property owners make the 
economical choice of accepting the government’s offer.225 Quite 
often, the potential for recovery is outweighed by these possible 
costs.226 Since eminent domain attorneys in Georgia often work on a 
contingent fee basis, they are simply unable to take on cases unless 
there is a large enough potential recovery.227  
A chief acquisition officer in Minnesota said the following to 
landowners whose property was being acquired for a state park 
project in that state:228  
                                                                                                                 
 224. Kanner, supra note 44, at 1105 (2007) (arguing that property owners often accept offers despite 
their inadequacy because the property owners “lack the knowledge and funds necessary to ascertain true 
value and mount an effective legal defense” or “the economic stakes do not justify litigation because 
probable increases over and above the condemnor’s initial offer may be close to or less than the 
unrecoverable cost of litigation”). 
 225. Friedman, supra note 145, at 696. Friedman explains the landowner’s inferior bargain power: 
[F]ollowing the announcement of the condemnor’s intent to condemn and the initial offer 
to purchase, the condemnee will be prejudiced during any subsequent negotiations due to 
a fear of incurring substantial litigation expenses in the event that he and the condemnor 
are unable to reach a settlement. It is this fear that compels many landowners to settle out 
of court for less than just compensation: they wish to avoid what may be a greater loss 
occasioned by a jury award of the fair market value, from which is to be deducted the 
costs of the litigation. 
Id. 
 226. In commenting on Arkansas’ proposed legislation which would require the condemnor to pay 
attorneys’ fees where a final award exceeds the state’s offer by ten percent or more, Republican Andrea 
Lea expressed fear “that many people wouldn’t know enough to find an attorney who worked on 
contingency and wouldn’t have enough money to fight the state. ‘How many people just throw in the 
towel?’ she asked.” Frago, supra note 201; see also Marie Price, Lawmakers Rethink Attorney Fees for 
Eminent Domain Deals, JOURNAL-RECORD (Okla.), Dec. 16, 1999 (quoting attorney Kim Ritchie as 
saying, in regard to the debate over an attorneys’ fee statute in Oklahoma, “[Landowners] could cave in 
because they think they can’t fight the state”). 
 227. See Kanner, supra note 44, at 1105 (“The consensus among condemnation lawyers is that, unless 
the ‘spread’ between the condemnor’s offer and the property’s demonstrable value is on the order of 
$75,000 to $100,000, litigation is not economically feasible.”); see also Dustin Block, Attorney Rallies 
Opposition to Wisconsin Department of Transportation Rule, DAILY REP., Mar. 23, 2009 (quoting a 
Wisconsin eminent domain attorney as saying that if Wisconsin sets a cap on attorneys’ fees, which are 
currently recoverable under statute, “[c]ases where the state wants to take 10 to 20 acres from a farmer 
would not be economical to pursue”). 
 228. See Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688, 691–92 (1985). 
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Even though we know what your lands are worth, we are going 
to try and get them for 30 cents on every dollar that we feel they 
are worth. Of course, you don’t have to accept this 30 cents on 
the dollar. . . . After a couple of years if you won't take 30 cents 
on the dollar, we are going to condemn it. We will condemn your 
property. You know what that is going to mean? That means that 
you are going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from the city 
and he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know 
who is going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is in 
addition to these expensive lawyers.229 
The officer’s unvarnished remarks illustrate the government’s 
awareness of its supreme bargaining power in a situation where legal 
redress is often an uneconomical choice for the condemnee. Although 
many acquisition agents are likely wise enough not to make such a 
blatant declaration of disregard for a property owner’s rights, such a 
mindset potentially exists where the condemnor knows that a legal 
battle is simply not feasible for the landowner.230 
Acquisition agents in Georgia are undoubtedly aware that property 
owners will not be able to afford to litigate in many cases. Although 
Georgia’s statutes require that acquisition agents “make every 
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property by 
negotiation”231 and forbid agents from acting in “bad faith,”232 
without the threat of a challenge to their offers, an important check 
on excessive government power is missing. A fee-shifting statute 
would encourage more fair offers from the outset, while also 
encouraging the government to settle prior to trial.233 This is because 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 887 (noting that “[p]rivate property rights activists 
allege that the undercompensation problem is further exacerbated by the government’s superior 
bargaining position in its negotiations with owners”). 
 231. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-9(1) (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
 232. Id. § 22-1-9(7). 
 233. Garnett, supra note 202, at 130 (“[F]ee-shifting statutes penalize the government for 
unreasonably refusing to settle prior to trial.”). 
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the condemnor must take into account not only the possibility of his 
own legal expenses, but those of the condemnee as well.234  
Critics of fee-shifting statutes may argue that a system like 
Florida’s provides its citizens with this procedural safeguard, and yet 
eminent domain litigation persists in Florida. For example, in one 
case, an elderly couple’s retirement was suddenly jeopardized when 
they received a check for a mere $109,750 for the apartment building 
they purchased upon moving to Florida.235 After learning that a 
neighbor had received twice as much, the couple engaged in a three-
year-legal-battle that produced a jury award of $305,000 plus 
interest.236 In yet another case, a K-mart store received a $3.2 million 
verdict at trial after challenging the state’s offer of $158,000.237 The 
trial court judge opined that the DOT had “prolong[ed], at the 
taxpayers’ expense, as well as at the expense of judicial economy, 
what should have been a normal eminent domain case.”238 These 
examples show that the procedural protections implemented by the 
state sometimes fail. Although Georgia added significant protections 
for property owners with its eminent domain legislation in 2006,239 
the system does not always work perfectly in practice. Checks, 
therefore, should be instituted to make sure that procedures are 
followed. However, when the system fails and property owners must 
litigate in order to be made whole, they should be compensated for 
the expenses they incur. 
2.  Fundamental Fairness  
In an eminent domain case decided at the end of the Great 
Depression, Justice Douglas announced, “The law of eminent domain 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Florida’s DOT manual requires that when evaluating a potential settlement, the anticipated costs 
of litigation including the landowner’s attorneys’ fees must be taken into consideration. See STATE OF 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RIGHT OF WAY MANUAL, ADMINISTRATIVE 
SETTLEMENTS 2–4 (2009), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/rightofway/documents/ 
ROWmanual/guide6.pdf. 
 235. Jackovics, supra note 148. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
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is fashioned out of the conflict between the people’s interest in public 
projects and the principle of indemnity to the landowner.”240 As 
Georgia faces the growing pains of rapid expansion in a time of 
severely constrained budgets and an economic downturn, Justice 
Douglas’s characterization of this inherent tension in eminent domain 
law rings true now more than ever. Georgia undoubtedly has a need 
to create the public infrastructure to support its growing population 
while also protecting a private property owner’s right to just 
compensation.241 
Many courts have recognized that indemnity requires property 
owners to be made whole and those who must litigate to receive just 
compensation for their property are not made whole.242 Inevitably, 
any recovery that the landowner receives is reduced by the amount 
that she must spend to obtain that recovery, effectually penalizing the 
landowner the amount of her litigation expenses.243 Once the 
property owner deducts the costs of mounting her legal defense, she 
is left with an amount below just compensation. Fundamental fairness 
therefore requires that society as a whole should bear the burden of 
litigation costs rather than the individual.244  
A common concern is that such fee-shifting provisions in the 
eminent domain context will lead to increased costs of land 
                                                                                                                 
 240. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943). 
 241. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 242. E.g., Lehigh Clay Prods., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 545 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 1996) 
(explaining that the purpose Iowa’s fee-shifting statute is “to more nearly make whole those property 
owners whose lands are taken by eminent domain and who must litigate in the courts in order to obtain a 
proper determination of their just compensation;” otherwise, if property owners are “required to pay 
their own attorney fees, much of the benefit that might be gained by a successful appeal would be offset 
by the resulting legal costs”); Meyers v. State, 634 N.Y.S.2d. 642, 645 (Ct. Cl. 1995) (“The purpose of 
[New York’s fee-shifting statute] is neither to chill nor encourage attorney advocacy,” but it is intended 
“to permit an additional, discretionary allowance to ameliorate expenses which might otherwise 
diminish an appropriation award to something less than just compensation.”); Dade County v. Brigham, 
47 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1950); Friedman, supra note 145, at 703 (citing City & County of San 
Francisco v. Collins, 33 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1893) (requiring the defendants to pay trial costs for themselves 
or the condemnor “would reduce the just compensation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid 
by them for such costs”). 
 243. Friedman, supra note 145, at 697. 
 244. In commenting on Illinois’s proposed statute in 2006 for reimbursement of attorney fees, John 
Bradley, a sponsor of the bill, put it well when saying, “It’s a philosophical decision we have to 
make . . . [w]here does the pendulum land? In my view, it lands with the private property owner.” Philip 
Ewing, House OKs Curbs on Eminent Domain, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 2006, at A1. 
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acquisition.245 In its annual report on rights of way and surveys, the 
Minnesota DOT commented, “We are beginning to see some of the 
effects of the eminent domain legislation passed by the Legislature in 
2006. Payments for attorney fees and costs are beginning to rise.”246 
Increases in land acquisition costs are inevitable if the statute works 
as intended. A fee-shifting statute theoretically forces acquisition 
agents to make fair offers from the outset, which in turn increases 
land acquisition costs. If offers are not increased to the fair market 
value, then the statute causes an increase in costs to the state when it 
must pay the condemnee’s expenses for litigating to receive his fair 
compensation. Either way, costs will rise when a fee-shifting statute 
is implemented. However, just like the payment of relocation 
expenses that Georgia added in 2006,247 which will obviously result 
in greater acquisition costs to the state, legislative grace provides for 
the reimbursement of these costs and is necessary to ensure that 
property owners are made whole. 
C.  Proposed Fee-Shifting Statute 
Reimbursement of Owner’s Attorneys’ Fees in Eminent Domain 
Actions 
(1) In all eminent domain actions, the court shall award 
attorneys’ fees to the property owner based on the benefits 
achieved for the client. 
(a) As used in this section, the term “benefits” means the 
difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. Opponents of the then proposed attorney fee reimbursement statute in Illinois said, “the new 
legal hurdle could slow or stop economic revitalization.” Id.; see also Price, supra note 226 (“Having to 
pay landowners’ attorney fees in some eminent domain cases for acquiring highway rights-of-way adds 
substantially to the costs of road projects.”); Bill Moss, Lawyers Target Two Who Pushed Fee Cuts, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 9, 1992, at 1B (“‘The expensive process of acquiring the land—not the 
land itself—is what has driven the cost skyward, critics say’ regarding Florida’s ‘spiraling cost of right 
of way for highway projects.’”).  
 246. STATEWIDE ANNUAL REPORT: RIGHT OF WAY AND SURVEYS FISCAL YEAR 2009, MINNESOTA 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 12 (2009), available at http://www.olmweb.dot.state.mn.us/reports/ 
Annualreports/AnnualReportFY2009.pdf. 
 247. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-13 (1982 & Supp. 2010). 
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or settlement and the last written offer by the acquisition 
agent prior to condemning the property. 
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits 
obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to 
the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically 
identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree 
of certainty, be quantified. 
(c) Attorneys’ fees based on benefits achieved shall be 
awarded in accordance with the following schedule: 
1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000; 
plus 
2. Twenty-five percent of any portion of the benefit 
between $250,000 and $1 million; plus 
3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit 
exceeding $1 million. 
(2) Attorneys’ fees as defined under this section shall include all 
reasonable costs that are necessary to litigate the action. 
(3) In determining whether the attorneys’ fees to be paid by the 
petitioner under subsection (1) are reasonable under subsection 
(2), the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would 
ordinarily be expected to pay for these services if the petitioner 
was not responsible for the payment of those fees. 
(4) At least 30 days prior to a hearing to assess attorneys’ fees 
under subsection (1), the condemnee’s attorney shall submit to 
the condemning authority and to the court the complete time 
records and a detailed statement of services rendered by date, 
nature of the services performed, time spent performing such 
services, and costs incurred. 
(5) The condemnee shall provide to the court a copy of any fee 
arrangement that may exist between the defendant and his or her 
attorney, and the court must reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees 
to be paid by the defendant by the amount of any attorneys’ fees 
awarded by the court. 
(6) The trial court may at its discretion deny or reduce any 
recovery under section (1) if it finds that in light of the evidence 
admitted at trial and the compensation awarded that: 
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(a) the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding; 
(b) the condemnee’s position was substantially unjustified; 
or 
(c) special circumstances exist that make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
This proposed statute represents a combination of Florida’s248 and 
Delaware’s249 eminent domain fee-shifting statutes with some 
alterations. Recovery of attorneys’ fees for the landowner is 
mandatory as in Florida; however, much like Delaware’s statute, the 
trial judge retains the discretion to limit the award of fees when she 
finds that the condemnee unnecessarily delayed the proceeding, his 
position was substantially unjustified, or special circumstances would 
make an award of fees unjust. This built-in element of discretion 
would further deter frivolous or unjustified litigation.  
A mandatory provision with a discretionary element is superior to 
a pure discretionary provision because it provides a bright-line rule. 
If property owners, as well as condemnors, are unsure whether 
property owners will be able to recover under the statute, then part of 
the statute’s purpose is defeated. The statute cannot provide a 
necessary check on government unless all parties are assured of the 
landowner’s right to recovery. Without mandatory provisions the 
landowner will still be deterred from litigating meritorious claims. 
However, the amount that the government will have to pay must be 
enough to deter inadequate offers.  
For the mandatory portion of the statute, Florida represents the best 
statute for Georgia to replicate for several reasons. Florida has one of 
the oldest fee-shifting provisions in the nation dating back nearly 
sixty years.250 Over this time span Florida has been able to evaluate 
the effects of this provision and fine tune its statutes. In 1994, the 
Florida Legislature enacted its current benefit-based statute in 
                                                                                                                 
 248. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).  
 249. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 6111(3) (2009). 
 250. Florida established that landowners are entitled to attorneys’ fees in eminent domain actions in 
1950. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1950). 
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reaction to escalating right of way costs.251 Unlike other conditional 
statutes that require the final award be a set percentage of increase in 
order for the landowner to recover,252 Florida adopted a statute that 
conditions the award of attorneys’ fees on the dollar amount of 
increase that the attorney is able to obtain for his client.253 Whereas a 
strict percentage based statute arbitrarily sets a number that seems 
like it will be effective in deterring claims without substantial merit, 
Florida’s statute bases recovery on the amount of increase the 
attorney gained for the client and then allows a portion of that 
benefit, which reflects a contingent fee schedule, to be recovered.254 
Florida found that following the enactment of this statute, land 
acquisition costs associated with attorneys’ fees decreased without 
stifling litigation altogether.255 
This statute represents a compromise between making land 
acquisition cost prohibitive versus making litigation for landowners 
cost prohibitive. Unlike with statutes that only require the landowner 
to gain a judgment above the government’s initial offer, litigation still 
might not feasible in very low value cases.256 However, on the whole, 
the statute will provide most landowners with an important 
procedural safeguard, while also taking into account taxpayer 
concerns by not over-incentivizing litigation. 
Contrary to the Florida statute, which allows for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in the acquisition process,257 the proposed statute 
would limit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to condemnations. The 
                                                                                                                 
 251. OFF. OF PROGRAM POL’Y ANALYSIS AND GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT 99-02, 
JUSTIFICATION REVIEW RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION PROGRAM FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 11 (1999), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/ 
Reports/pdf/9902rpt.pdf. 
 252. See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text. 
 253. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2009).  
 254. Id. 
 255. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 160, 
at 3. 
 256. See Block, supra note 227 for an example of this situation. Louis Prange, a Wisconsin dairy 
breeder, was offered $14,000 by the Wisconsin DOT for land it needed to rebuild a highway. After three 
years of litigation, he won a $28,000 verdict. Prange’s legal fees exceeded the actual settlement amount, 
but the state was forced to pay Prange’s attorneys’ fees. Under a proposed law in Wisconsin to use a 
benefits-based approach, Prange’s fees would be limited to one-third the benefit achieved, equal to 
$4,700, making litigation cost-prohibitive for a landowner in a similar position to Prange. Id. 
 257. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2009). 
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justification for this difference is that prior to the condemnation, the 
government has not acted upon the property owner. During the 
negotiation phase, the property owner and condemning authority 
attempt to settle at a fair price, just as any two private parties 
attempting to reach a settlement would.  
Once the government condemns the property, the property owner 
should have the right to seek legal advice in order to evaluate whether 
the government’s offer is fair. When the attorney thinks that, based 
on the relevant law, the offer is too low, the attorney can then help 
her client build his case of valuation and defend the value of his 
property throughout the condemnation procedure. Because the statute 
only awards fees where the attorney achieves a benefit for her client, 
this will discourage frivolous litigation. When the state condemns 
through the Special Master or Assessor method and the offer is too 
low, the condemnee will need the assistance of an attorney from the 
point of the condemnation so that he can hire an appropriate appraiser 
to determine the value of his taking and then gather the necessary 
evidence and expert witnesses to establish his property’s value at the 
hearing.258 Likewise, a property owner appealing his award from a 
Declaration of Taking, or appealing from a Special Master or 
Assessor hearing, to the Superior Court will need access to these 
important litigation tools. This statute reimburses the property owner 
for these litigation expenses, however, only where they are necessary 
to receive just and adequate compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Georgia General Assembly must constantly strive to 
implement the Georgia Constitution’s guarantee that property owners 
receive just compensation when their property is taken for public 
use.259 In order for society to reap the benefit of being able to acquire 
private property for public projects, society must make the owner 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text for the procedure of the Special Master and 
Assessor condemnation methods. 
 259. GA. CONST. Art. I § III, para. I (2009). 
42
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 14
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/14
2011] EMINENT DOMAIN AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES  
 
871 
whole. As the Georgia Supreme Court has acknowledged, making an 
owner whole includes reimbursing him for his costs when he must 
litigate to receive just compensation.260  
The legislature correctly decided to repeal Georgia’s former fee-
shifting statute,261 since it deterred litigation and resulted in harm to 
property owners when they were forced to pay the condemnor’s 
expenses on appeal. However, the legislature left a void in Georgia 
law by failing to adopt a new fee-shifting statute. At least twenty 
other states have recognized the importance of this procedural 
protection for landowners and have thus implemented fee-shifting 
statutes.262  
Such a statute is crucial to ensuring that property owners in 
Georgia receive just compensation in eminent domain actions. The 
legislature should enact the proposed fee-shifting statute that applies 
Florida’s benefits based approach while incorporating an element of 
judicial discretion from Delaware’s statute. This statute will serve to 
encourage condemnors to make more reasonable offers from the 
outset, make property owners who are forced to litigate to receive just 
compensation whole again, and also deter frivolous or unjustified 
litigation—all while taking into consideration taxpayers’ concerns 
associated with the cost of land acquisition. 
Although public outcry from Kelo has largely died down, 
Georgia’s focus on eminent domain should not end. Legislators must 
continue to scrutinize the state’s procedural protections in order to 
protect property owners. In times of dire need for public 
infrastructure coupled with constrained budgets, the General 
Assembly might be tempted to shy away from legislation that has the 
potential for increasing the state’s acquisition costs. The legislature 
must undoubtedly balance what is fair to property owners with what 
is the least burdensome for taxpayers. A system requiring no payment 
of compensation would be the extreme of a scheme favoring 
taxpayers. However, this is not what the Georgia Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 260. White v. Ga. Power Co., 227 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Ga. 1976), rev’g Bowers v. Fulton County, 183 
S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 1971). 
 261. GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-84.1 (2005) (repealed 2006). 
 262. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
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requires. Property owners have a right to just compensation and this 
constitutional guarantee should not be compromised, no matter the 
state’s economic climate. 
The General Assembly should grant Georgia property owners this 
important legislative grace. If in the state’s struggle to provide 
infrastructure for its ever-growing number of residents the 
government makes a landowner an inadequate offer for her property, 
she, like Florida resident Mr. Santoni,263 deserves to be reimbursed 
for the costs she must bear in mounting a legal battle to  fight for her 
guaranteed just and adequate compensation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 263. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
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